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A Summary of Civil War Strategy and Tactics A Brief Summary of The Types of
© 09/29/03; Rev. 05/03/06
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This essay is an unabashed oversimplification of the manner in which the Civil War was fought. Originally I cooked this up as a free handout to be distributed during a Civil War reenactment I was giving talks at. To cut down on copying costs I intentionally made it as terse as possible. My goal was to try and show that the strategic and tactical framework of the war was far more intricate than the cliched recounting of Robert E. Lee's supposedly brilliant "offensive-defensive" manuvers and the blundering of a succession of Union generals. What really steams my cabbage is the hoary myth about accurate long-range infantry fire making the tactical doctrine used during the war obsolete, if you are interested you can read my views on that in my article on The Model 1855 Musket. I'd refer anybody who really wants to know about the topic addressed here to Archer Jones' Civil War Command and Strategy and Paddy Griffith's Battle Tactics of The Civil War. |
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In the Civil War the North normally pursued an offensive strategy and the South was generally on the defensive. This meant that both sides sought to control centers of supply, transportation and political importance located in the southern states. Although it was theoretically possible to assault and destroy the enemy army in battle, almost all such attempts to annihilate an opposing army as were tried during the war proved futile due to the similarity in tactics and weaponry used by both sides. As the tactical defense requires less maneuvering and affords the defender the opportunity to choose the ground on which they will receive the attack, there is an added burden that reduces the effectiveness of a similarly-armed attacking force. Unfortunately the civilian public and the political masters of the armies, particularly in the North, often saw warfare as little more than battles and expected victory to come with the crushing of the opposing armies in the field. Politics played a complex role in forming the aims and conduct of many campaigns and often conflicted with strictly military considerations. The advantage of the strategic defense aided the South. According to one estimate the Confederate Army enlisted around 1,000,000 men during the course of the Civil War while the United States Army had the equivalent of approximately 2,000,000 three-year enlistments. Despite being heavily outnumbered the Confederacy benefited from interior lines and could often concentrate its forces more effectively than the Federals. By the end of the conflict the Northern generals had learned to stage simultaneous advances in order to counter the South’s interior lines. When planning a campaign, the general in command had to decide on a line of operation upon which to move against the enemy. Likewise, the opposing commander would have to try to anticipate the enemy’s line of operation and develop a plan of his own to counter it. In the eastern theater the action focused mainly on the 100 miles between the capital cities of Washington D.C. and Richmond, Virginia. The relatively small scale of this area limited the options open to Northern commanders, restricting them to advancing on a few roads or attempting to out-flank the Confederate positions by transporting their troops by ship to a point on the Virginia coast. |
| For most of the war the Confederate
forces in Virginia were commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee who had an uncanny
ability to guess the moves of his opponents. In the west the Union made
its primary goals the capture of the Mississippi River and its tributaries
and the occupation of western Tennessee. After this was accomplished in
1863 the Union’s target became the seizure of the important city of Atlanta,
Georgia, which was followed by sending part of the western army to the
Atlantic seaboard in order to put more pressure on Gen. Lee and disrupt
the South’s ability and will to continue fighting.
The overriding concern of the generals in the Civil War was for their lines of communication. As the 1860’s American countryside had a relatively small population density it was not feasible for the armies to supply themselves directly from the areas in which they were located. Supplies had to be gathered from far behind the front and shipped to the field on a continuous basis. Railroads and steamboats were the most efficient ways to bring supplies to the troops, but use of railroads and steamboats for communications restricted the armies to operating within reach of railroad tracks, rivers and seacoasts. Supply wagons or pack mules could also be used but they were less popular as the draft animals ate almost as much as they carried and the presence of large numbers of wagons significantly slowed down an army on the move by clogging the roads. Both sides used cavalry raids to destroy supply depots, railroads, bridges and to cut telegraph lines. The cavalry raid was especially useful to the South as just the threat of such a raid would cause the Federals to deploy large numbers of their men to guard supply routes, which would weaken the strength of their main armies in the field. Additionally, the Confederacy had bands of guerrillas and partisan rangers operating against Union communications. Both North and South also made use of all-arms raids in force to disrupt enemy communications and push the enemy to make a move in response. Most Confederate “invasions” of the North were technically raids in force. Northern Generals Grant and Sherman also learned that by raiding in force they could temporarily escape the trap of having their offensives depend on the availability of rail and water communications. The strategic turning movement also became a favorite strategy for either side to to compel the enemy to retreat or fight at a disadvantage. |
| On campaign an army could generally
move only as fast as its footsoldiers, normally 10-20 miles a day. Cavalry
troopers on horseback could generally cover 20-30 miles a day. Campaigns
were usually suspended during the winter and early spring as the roads
were not passable. Armies on the march would often split up into several
large groups that would march on parallel roads towards an objective. Generals
would need a good knowledge of the area’s geography and would often employ
local scouts and spies to provide information on the region and indications
of the enemy’s location. Normally a general would only order an attack
on an enemy force if he felt it was weaker or in a vulnerable position,
or if an attack was necessary in order to deprive the enemy of a point
of strategic value or to prevent the enemy from making an advance of their
own on a strategic point. Many battles began quite accidentally when part
of one army unexpectedly encountered an enemy force and both sides then
rushed reinforcements to the scene in an attempt to gain an advantage.
Cavalry Raid: Cavalry using its superior mobility to get behind
the opposing force and break enemy lines of communication before
returning back to a base area.
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The armies of the Civil War had three combat arms: the infantry, cavalry and artillery. Both North and South, a large army would often number 50,000-100,000 men and would be commanded by a senior general. Usually about 80% of this combat strength would consist of infantry troops, divided into several corps. Each corps would be further split into divisions and each division into brigades. Cavalry and artillery units would either form their own cavalry divisions or artillery reserves and be attached to the army or corps; or split up into independent regiments and batteries, and then be assigned to infantry divisions or even brigades. In either case, in most Civil War battles the cavalry and artillery were only expected to support the infantry and not to play a decisive role on their own. In the 19th century the most common infantry formations were the column and the line. As a general rule a brigade would maneuver in column(s) until it was near the enemy when it would deploy in one or more double-ranked lines of battle in order to maximize its firepower. When on the march an army’s units would often move in column by separate roads in order to reach a strategic goal. A battle would begin when part of one army made contact with part of the enemy’s. Once contact was made the initial goal for the commanders of the divisions and corps concerned on either side would be to reinforce the brigade(s) closest to the enemy. If a general engagement was desired they would mass to form a force capable of delivering or receiving an assault, or, if one side did not want to fight a full battle, the nearest brigades would deploy as a rearguard while the rest of the army moved away. In either case the local commander would study the area’s geography and attempt to establish a strong position for his side. If both sides chose to fight or if the weaker army was unable to withdraw, the battle would develop. As brigades rushed forward (in columns), they would form lines upon reaching the field and send out skirmishers to probe the enemy positions and screen their own. A good division commander would arrange for his brigades to present a continuous front to the enemy and perhaps hold a brigade in reserve to reinforce the others as the battle develops. |
| If the battle was expected to occur
and/or one side’s general in command believed that he had a reasonably
accurate understanding of the enemy’s location, a large-scale maneuver
might be attempted to gain advantage over the enemy. Otherwise, the battle
would develop haphazardly as the corps and division commanders rushed forward
reinforcements and tried to locate the enemy’s weak points. In this case
the commanding general’s job was mainly to make sure that each corps advanced
as quickly and as orderly as possible to the right locations.
The goal of most commanders was to concentrate the bulk of their army against
part of the enemy’s in order to defeat them in
detail.
If the general did wish to make a large-scale attack, this would normally take the form of either a tactical turning movement or frontal assault. In either case the preferred method was to distract the enemy with a demonstration while the main force (usually several divisions or an entire corps) moved against the chosen point of attack. This battle handling relied greatly on staff work. If the general was able to develop his plans and communicate them well his army could normally carry out a large maneuver across several miles of ground within a few hours of receiving the order. An attack, once launched, could seldom be recalled. The best method of attack, but most difficult to achieve, was the tactical turning movement. Ideally the attacking force would march around the enemy’s line and launch a surprise assault that would cause the enemy to withdraw in panic or even surrender. Most often the attacking force would be detected by the enemy before it was able to achieve a decisive position and the enemy would re-deploy their line to meet this new threat, which would lead to a more or less protracted infantry fire-fight. A very ambitious form of the turning movement was the double envelopment, which sought to get troops behind both of the enemy’s flanks. |
| The alternative to a turning movement
was a direct frontal assault aimed at breaking the enemy’s lines where
they were expected to be weakest. Although the frontal assault was relatively
easy to organize, it usually had a low chance of success and devolved into
a large-scale infantry fire-fight where each side tried to shoot the other
from its position. By the later half of the war both sides would regularly
entrench
when stopped, so an attacking force would be at the further disadvantage
in a frontal assault of having to attempt to out-shoot an enemy from its
protected position while the attacking troops were in the open.
Bayonet charges could theoretically drive an enemy from his position through the principle of shock, but they were seldom used on a large scale in the Civil War. Throughout the conflict both sides remained wedded to a tactical system based on infantry firepower. |
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